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Introduction 
Although initial public offerings (IPOs) have recently attracted public and academic 
attention, the special case of firms founded by families or single entrepreneurs has not been 
investigated in depth. Given the lack of empirical research on family-controlled businesses 
(McConaughy, Matthews and Fialko 2001), this study is an attempt to remedy this deficiency. 
For family-owned firms, a change in ownership structure by going public is a significant change 
in the governance of the corporation, because for the first time outside shareholders come into 
play. This pattern is typically to be observed for IPOs of family-owned firms in Germany.1 
Our paper merges two strands of research: on the one hand, the entrepreneurial literature 
on family-controlled businesses, on the other hand, the vastly increasing research on corporate 
governance and initial public offerings (IPOs). After reviewing some of the related literature, we 
present empirical evidence about (i) the change in corporate governance (as proxied by a change 
in the ownership structure) following IPOs, and (ii) its impact on the long-run stock performance 
of family-owned firms in Germany. We conclude with a summary of the major findings. 
 
Related Literature 
Franks and Mayer (2001) report that family business shareholdings account for one third 
of total shareholdings in Germany. They argue that family investors, since their wealth is directly 
tied to that of the family firm, seem to exert strong disciplining of poorly performing 
management. For the US, Kang (2000) and McConaughy, Matthews and Fialko (2001) find that 
family controlled firms have greater value and are operated more efficiently than non-founding 
                                                          
1 We classify a firm as founding family owned, if one or more individual members of one or two founding families 
(together) own a fraction of the equity of at least 50 percent. This is different from the definition of founding family 
controlled firms used McConnaughy, Matthews and Fialko (2001). 
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family controlled firms. In a recent article, Bhattacharya and Ravikumar (2001) show that the 
development of efficient capital markets accelerates the evolution and the sale of family 
businesses. Thus, the public sale of family-owned firms and their resulting performance is a topic 
with growing importance. 
In Germany there were at least three factors, which prohibited founding families from 
selling their firms, during our investigation period. One, tax regulation made the sale of privately 
held equity stakes less attractive. Although the profit on the sale of exchange-traded shares is tax-
exempt after a holding period of one year, selling stakes in non-quoted companies is taxed at high 
rates. Two, low competition in the underwriting market and thereby high direct costs of an IPO 
led to capital-raising firms preferring Hausbank-financed debt financing or private placements. 
Three, German ideas on family values and the corporate mission of family-owned firms also 
resulted in many owners rather not taking public their firms (Schürmann and Körfgen 1997). 
Goergen and Renneboog (2002) provide a comparative study on the evolution of 
ownership and control in German and UK IPOs. They found that initial shareholders (including 
families) lose majority control on average six years after the IPO in Germany. However, in two 
thirds of their sample of 52 German IPOs, initial shareholders retain absolute majority control, 
and the probability of retaining control concentration augments when non-voting shares are 
issued. Goergen (1998) studied ownership retention in German and UK IPOs, the determinants of 
ownership retention, and its impact on IPO long-term performance. He found that the long-run 
performance of IPOs is not correlated with ownership retention. Overall, he suggests that the poor 
long-term performance of IPOs in his sample, compared to the stock market as a whole, cannot 
be explained by agency conflicts caused by the reduction in ownership by the original 
shareholders.  
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We focus our attention on the strategic decisions of family-owners floating their firms. 
We restrict our analysis for the following reasons. First, family-owned firms have long been the 
most typical firms in Germany to undertake a change of ownership by means of an IPO. Second, 
a family-owned firm comes closest to one in which ownership and control are not separated until 
the IPO, making it ideal for investigating the performance effect of a change in the corporate 
governance structure. In the next section, we present the theoretical background for building our 
testable hypotheses. 
 
Governance Changes in Family Firms through IPOs 
Founding Family Stockholders’ Strategic Decisions 
An equity sale through an IPO has two distinct features. First, by definition it induces a 
change in the ownership structure of the firm. Second, given the presence of high initial returns, 
it leads to a transfer of wealth from the incumbent owners to the new shareholders. For a firm 
with a given investment program, an artificially low IPO price (“underpricing”) leads to a 
proportionate reduction (increase) in incumbent (new) shareholder wealth. The high level of 
information asymmetry at the IPO induces insiders to sell equity both in the new issue market and 
in the secondary market. Through the signaling by underpricing and high ownership retention, 
insiders benefit from inducing information production by outside investors in order to obtain a 
more precise valuation of their firms in the secondary market (Leland and Pyle 1977; 
Chemmanur 1993). 
In addition to the issuance volume and the price range of the IPO, the choice between the 
classes of issued shares (ordinary vs. non-voting/ preferred stock) has an impact on the resulting 
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ownership structure of the firm.2 The detailed specifications of the IPO are contracted upon 
between the issuing firm, its advisors, and the lead underwriter. 
We only investigate German IPOs that are issued by family-owned firms, or are at least 
governed by a controlling stake of the founding family. The terms of the issuance contract are 
then driven by the founding family’s intention to keep control of the firm even after the IPO, if 
not a complete sale (exit) is planned in the short- or mid-term.3 The models discussed below 
suggest that the terms and conditions of an IPO are contracted upon by the family owner 
according to strategic considerations with respect to the future ownership structure of the firm. 
These strategic considerations are driven by the incumbent shareholders’ desire to 
maximize their expected long-run returns from their equity holdings and their private benefits 
from owning the firm. Assuming rational expectations and optimal contracting with respect to the 
economic consequences of ownership changes, as well as perfect competition between firms and 
managers, measures of ownership concentration should not be correlated with stock returns.4 
However, if (one or more of) these assumptions are violated, irrelevance of the ownership 
structure does no longer hold, resulting in systematic differences in the cost of governing the 
firm.5 Given that these differences exist, they should empirically be verifiable by positive or 
negative abnormal returns depending on the level of ownership concentration. 
                                                          
2 Also a high dispersion of ownership of the ordinary shares might lead to a high proportion of proxy voted shares by 
the underwriting banks in the IPO. However, Franks and Mayer (2001) find that proxy voting is of negligible 
importance in the presence of a large shareholder. 
3 There are several hints in the literature that family owners fear an involuntary transfer in the corporate governance 
structure of the corporation. This is one of the main reasons given for the observed reluctance to going publics of 
family-owned firms in Germany. See for example Schürmann and Körfgen (1997). 
4  This classic argument is given by Demsetz (1983). 
5  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) give an overview on agency-costs and corporate governance. See also Allen and 
Winton (1995). 
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Models of Ownership Changes through IPOs 
IPO related models of ownership structure changes focus on the role of an initial public 
offering in maximizing the proceeds that an initial owner obtains when selling equity to the 
public. Intuitively, the proportion of ownership must depend on the optimal combination of 
majority control and dispersed ownership that maximizes the founding family's wealth. 
In Zingales’ (1995) model, the initial owner of a firm, in deciding whether to undertake an 
IPO and what fraction of ownership to retain, must balance two factors. By selling to disperse 
shareholders, he maximizes his proceeds from the sale of cash flow rights. However, by direct 
bargaining with a potential buyer, he maximizes his proceeds from the sale of control rights. The 
insider's ownership in public companies depends on the optimal combination of the value of cash 
flow rights and the value of control rights that maximizes the incumbent owner's wealth. Thus, 
the initial owner maximizes his total proceeds by selling the company in a two-staged process. 
Bebchuk (1999) models the decision of a company's initial owner on whether to maintain 
control when the company goes public. The choice between concentrated and dispersed 
ownership of corporate shares and votes seems to be determined by the size of private control 
benefits. When private benefits of control are large, maintaining control of the company enables 
the initial shareholders to capture a larger fraction of the surplus from value-producing transfers 
of control. In order to maintain control of the firm, the initial owners can issue non-voting stock, 
thereby implementing a dual-class shareholder structure. He derives the testable hypothesis that 
such a separation of cash flow rights and voting rights will tend to be used in conjunction with a 
controlling shareholder structure but not with a dispersed ownership structure. In that context, 
many family-owned firms issue non-voting preferred stock, in order to prevent that the founding 
family may no longer hold the absolute majority of the voting rights. 
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Empirical Analysis 
We analyze 105 IPOs of founding family-owned firms floated in the period from January 
1970 to December 1990. The average (median) age of a sample family firm is 63.6 (58) company 
years. Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) investigate a sample of 68 Italian IPOs floated on the 
Milan stock exchange from 1982 through 1992 and report an average (median) age of 33.4 (26) 
years. Rydqvist and Högholm (1995) report a European average IPO age of 40 years. Holmén and 
Högfeldt (2000) analyze a sample of 158 privately controlled Swedish IPOs from 1979 to mid 
1997 and find an average age of 33 years. For the US, the respective average age figures lie 
between five years for venture-backed firms (Gompers 1996) and 18 years (Field and Karpoff 
2002). Although European IPOs are generally older than their US counterparts, the family firms 
in our sample are at a very late stage in their lifecycle, even compared to European standards. 
Corporate Governance Changes 
Figure 1 contains the proportion of voting rights of families and other shareholders ten 
years after the IPO. Several observations can be drawn from the results. At first sight, ten years 
after the IPO, the founding family shareholders seem to have withdrawn from the company, 
because the average proportion of voting rights is only 40.4 percent. However, for those 60 
percent of firms where the founding family is still involved, the mean proportion of the 
controlling stake is 63.1 percent. In the 34.3 percent of all cases where a transfer of ownership 
resulted in a change in the corporate governance of the firm, the new controlling blockholder 
holds 80.3 percent, on average. Overall, the influence of family stockholders remains high for ten 
years following the IPO, and the founding family continues to exercise considerable influence on 
corporate control. 
 8
 [Please insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Evolution of Ownership Structure and the Separation of Cash Flow and Control Rights 
According to Bebchuk (1999), the choice between concentrated and dispersed ownership 
of corporate shares and votes seems to be determined by the size of private control benefits. 
When private benefits of control are low, the initial owner chooses a dispersed ownership 
structure and sells out ordinary shares at the IPO. In countries, such as Germany, in which private 
benefits of control are supposedly large, the founding family often maintains a lock on control 
through the separation of cash flow rights and voting rights. The results of his model imply that 
non-voting shares are issued at the IPO only in cases where the majority of voting rights is 
retained by the family shareholders. 
This is indeed the case, as is evidenced by Table 1. The mean proportion of voting rights 
even ten years after the IPO is still 51.8 percent for firms that issue non-voting preference shares. 
This proportion is significantly different from the mean proportion of voting rights when ordinary 
shares are issued at the time of the offering (31.7 percent), supporting the hypothesis of Bebchuk 
(1999). In order to keep their private benefits of control in the long run, some family owners have 
established a dual-class share structure. Those that did not issue non-voting preferred stock have 
given up the majority of voting rights already five years after the IPO, on average. 
[Please insert Table 1 about here] 
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Founding Family Control and Long-Run Stock Performance 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that the larger the firm becomes, the larger are the total 
agency costs because it is likely that monitoring is more difficult and thus more expensive. They 
argue that if a firm's manager holds a larger fraction of its common stock, agency problems are 
brought under control by better aligning the manager's interests with those of the shareholders.  
Leland and Pyle (1977) in their model show, that managers of high-quality firms can 
signal by increasing leverage and holding larger equity stakes. Consequently, firms with high 
leverage have a larger fraction of inside ownership and are, on average, of better quality. Thus, 
they suggest a positive linear relation between inside ownership and the market value of the firm. 
Since within family-owned firms, managerial control is often exerted by family members, this 
linear relation could be assumed for most of the firms in our sample. However, empirical 
evidence does not seem to support this linearity hypothesis of concentrated ownership and firm 
performance in a convincing fashion.6 
Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that the firm’s owners determine the 
ownership structure in a systematically value-maximizing way. According to them, since the 
ownership structure is optimally chosen, it cannot have any impact on the value of the firm- and 
therefore, on its performance.7 The results of Goergen (1998) seem to support the hypothesis of 
no relation between long-run performance and ownership. However it should be noted that the 
rationale of the initial owners is not to maximize total firm value or total shareholder returns, 
instead their goal is to maximize the sum of the value of the returns to their holdings of cash flow 
rights and their private benefits. Investigating long-run stock performance therefore is looking 
from the perspective of the small (minority) investors. 
                                                          
6 See Böhmer (1993), or Krinsky and Rotenberg (1988), for empirical tests of the Leland-Pyle model. 
7 See Demsetz and Lehn (1985). 
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In order to detect a possible impact of ownership changes on performance, we examine 
the relation between voting rights concentration of family stockholders in the first three years 
following the IPO and the corresponding long-term stock returns. For our analysis, we construct 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BAHRs) based on the difference between the result of buy-and-
hold investments in IPO stocks and the result of buy-and-hold investments in a size-matched 
benchmark portfolio. 
On average, the long-run underperformance of the IPO firms in our sample is about minus 
eight percent (Table 2). However, this underperformance can be attributed merely to the 
underperformance of the non-voting shares issued. The performance of the ordinary shares issued 
at the IPO is neutral and not significantly negative from zero. The underperformance of the non-
voting shares in our sample is much higher being almost minus 20 percent. Although the 
difference in means between the two subsamples is not statistically significant at a reasonable 
level, the economic insight of this pattern is strong.8 
We further examine the proportions of voting rights of family stockholders three years 
after market flotation. The firms are allocated to one of four classes, and the mean excess return 
calculated for each of these classes. The results presented in the lower part of Table 2 show that a 
high concentration of voting rights (VR > 75 percent) leads to a significantly negative abnormal 
return, on average. This observation is especially evident for firms that issue non-voting stock. 
The long-term stock return is also negative when family stockholders pull back from the 
firm (VR < 25 percent). In these firms, the proportion of voting rights of a single, new large 
stockholder is significantly higher than in the other firms examined. Positive cross-sectional 
excess returns are observed for voting right concentrations of between 25 percent and 75 percent. 
                                                          
8  We think that the low significance is simply driven by the small sample size in conjunction with high standard 
variation. Further testing with larger samples has to validate our results. 
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According to our results, especially high market valuations of the firm can be achieved when 
family stockholders reduce their proportion of voting rights to between 25 and 50 percent. These 
observations – although lacking statistical significance - suggest the possibility of a nonlinear 
relation between the concentration of voting rights and the returns the cash flow rights of a firm. 
[Please insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Conclusion 
Even ten years after the IPO, founding family owners continue to exercise considerable 
corporate control. Thus, the influence of family shareholders on their firms can be preserved 
usually, despite the financing of equity capital through public offerings. We do not find support 
for the hypothesis that founding family shareholders maximize their proceeds from the sale of 
their shares. Although they always sell cash flow rights, the final complete sale of a corporate 
stake rarely seems to be the motive for a market flotation. It seems that returns to private benefits 
are higher accruing to the founding family than to other large shareholders. Also, the poor return 
development of these firms does suggest a maximization of total returns to the large shareholders 
while expropriating rents from minority shareholders. The private benefits of control for family 
shareholders seem to be so large that it never pays them to sell the firm completely. 
We find strong evidence for Bebchuk’s hypothesis (1999), that the separation of cash flow 
rights and voting rights will tend to be used in conjunction with a controlling shareholder 
structure but not with a dispersed ownership structure. In order to keep the private benefits from 
control, incumbent owners establish dual-class share structures. Finally, we find some evidence 
for the existence of a nonlinear relation between the concentration of voting rights and the stock 
performance of a firm. The empirical results posit that new shareholders in family founded firms 
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should beware when only non-voting shares are issued. Voting rights concentrations above 75 
percent seem to be value-decreasing. 
 13
 
References 
Allen, Franklin and Andrew Winton (1995). “Corporate Financial Structure, Incentives and 
Optimal Contracting,” in Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science 9. Eds. R. 
Jarrow, V. Maksimovic and W. Ziemba. Amsterdam, Holland: Elsevier, 693-720. 
Bebchuk, Lucian A. (1999). “A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control,” 
John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Working Paper 260, Harvard University.  
Bhattacharya, Utpal and B. Ravikumar (2001). “Capital Markets and the Evolution of Family 
Businesses,” Journal of Business 74 (2), 187-219. 
Böhmer, Ekkehard (1993). “The Informational Content of Initial Public Offerings: A Critical 
Analysis of the Ownership-Retention Signalling Model,” International Review of Financial 
Analysis 2 (2), 77-95.  
Chemmanur, Thomas J. (1993). “The Pricing of Initial Public Offerings: A Dynamic Model with 
Information Production, Journal of Finance 48 (1), 285-304. 
Demsetz, Harold (1983). “The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm,” Journal of 
Law and Economics 16 (6), 375-390.  
Demsetz, Harold and Kenneth Lehn (1985). “The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and 
Consequences,” Journal of Political Economy 93 (6), 1155-1177. 
Field, Laura C. and Jonathan Karpoff (2002). “Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms," Journal of 
Finance 57 (5), 1857-1889.  
Franks, Julian and Colin Mayer (2001). “Ownership, Control and the Performance of German 
Corporations,” Review of Financial Studies 14 (4), 943-977.  
Gompers, Paul (1996). “Grandstanding in the Venture Capital Industry,” Journal of Financial 
Economics 42 (1), 133-156. 
Goergen, Marc (1998). “Insider Retention and Long-Run Performance in German and UK IPOs,” 
Working Paper, University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology. 
Goergen, Marc and Luc Renneboog (2002). “Prediction of Ownership and Control Concentration 
in German and UK Initial Public Offerings,” in Convergence and Diversity in Corporate 
Governance Regimes and Capital Markets. Eds. L. Renneboog, J. McCahery, Oxford University 
Press, 2002. 
Holmén, Martin and Peter Högfeldt (2000). “A Law and Finance Analysis of Initial Public 
Offerings,” Working Paper, Stockholm School of Economics.  
Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling (1976). “Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4), 305-360. 
Kang, David L. (2000). “Family Ownership and Performance in Public Corporations: A Study of 
the U.S. Fortune 500, 1982-1994,” Harvard Business School Working Paper 00-051. 
Krinsky, Itzhak and Wendy Rotenberg (1988). “The Valuation of Initial Public Offerings,” 
Contemporary Accounting Research 5 (2), 501-515. 
 14
Leland, Hayne E. and David Pyle (1977). “Information Asymmetries, Financial Structure and 
Financial Intermediation,” Journal of Finance 32 (2), 737-748.  
McConaughy, Daniel L., Charles H. Matthews and Anne S. Fialko (2001). “Founding Family 
Controlled Firms: Efficiency, Risk, and Value,” Journal of Small Business Management 39 (1), 
31-49. 
Pagano, Marco, Fabio Panetta, and Luigi Zingales (1998). “Why Do Companies Go Public? An 
Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Finance 53 (1), 27-64. 
Rydqvist, Kristian, and Kenneth Högholm (1995). “Going Public in the 1980s: Evidence from 
Sweden,” European Financial Management 1 (3), 287-316. 
Schürmann, Walter and Kurt Körfgen (1997). Familienunternehmen auf dem Weg zur Börse, 
München: Beck. 
Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny (1997). “A Survey of Corporate Governance,” Journal of 
Finance 52 (2), 737-783.  
Zingales, Luigi (1995). “Insider Ownership and the Decision to Going Public,” Review of 
Economic Studies 62 (3), 425-448. 
 15
Table 1 
Evolution of Ownership Structure through Time 
    Mean Proportion of Voting Rights 
Held by Old and New Shareholders (percent) 
   All IPOs Ordinary Shares 
Issued at the Time 
of the Offering 
Non-Voting Shares 
Issued at the Time 
of the Offering 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Pre-IPO       
Family Shareholders a 98.24 100.00 98.59 100.00 97.74 100.00
Other Old Shareholders b 1.76 0.00 1.41 0.00 2.26 0.00
At the IPO       
Family Shareholders a 77.07 75.06 62.33 66.70 97.50 100.00
Other Old Shareholders b 0.89 0.00 0.72 0.00 1.31 0.00
New Blockholders c 0.57 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.00
Free Float 21.47 23.00 35.97 33.30 1.19 0.00
3 Years after the IPO       
Family Shareholders a 67.93 70.00 54.18 59.00 86.98 100.00
Other Old Shareholders b 0.48 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.85 0.00
New Blockholders c 7.15 0.00 9.43 0.00 3.97 0.00
Free Float 24.44 25.00 35.84 34.70 8.20 0.00
5 Years after the IPO       
Family Shareholders a 57.85 63.00 47.00 51.00 72.90 95.10
Other Old Shareholders b 0.37 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.58 0.00
New Blockholders c 16.93 0.00 17.66 0.00 15.93 0.00
Free Float 24.85 24.97 35.13 36.00 10.59 0.00
10 Years after the IPO       
Family Shareholders a 40.36 38.90 31.73 27.00 51.81 60.00
Other Old Shareholders b 0.10 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00
New Blockholders c 33.47 10.97 33.14 14.10 33.91 5.00
Free Float 26.07 24.45 34.95 34.00 14.28 5.00
Number of Observations 105 61 44 
Bankruptcies (10 Years after 
the IPOs) 
5 4 1 
Sources: IPO database at the Institut für Bank-, Börsen- und Versicherungswesen, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin; 
Hoppenstedt; Saling-Aktienführer; Commerzbank “Wer gehört zu wem”. 
a Family shareholders are defined as one or more individual members of the same family jointly holding a fraction of 
the equity. 
b Other old shareholders are institutional shareholders, management, employees, and individual shareholders include 
pre-IPO managerial ownership, and other privately placed shares.  
c New blockholders are domestic firms, foreign firms, banks and insurance companies, trust and investment 
companies and individuals. 
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Table 2 
Performance and Founding Family Control 
 
 
Long-Run (36 month) Performance of IPOs and Founding Family Owned Stake 
 
 Mean (t value)  
percent 
Median (z value) 
percent N 
All IPOs  -8.09         (-1.28) -14.29**   (-2.49) 105 
Voting Proportion of Founding 
Family Stake three Years after IPO 
   
     0  < Voting Rights ≤   .25 -25.48       (-1.51) -24.92     (-1.26) 8 
   .25 < Voting Rights ≤   .50  60.83         (1.61)   41.19      (1.18) 7 
   .50 < Voting Rights ≤   .75    -2.75       (-0.25) -13.24     (-1.32) 41 
   .75 < Voting Rights ≤ 1.00 -19.58***   (-2.74)  -32.16*** (-2.63) 49 
Exit of Family Owners three to ten 
Years after Going Public 
   
   Exit -11.08       (-1.02) -15.10*   (-1.91) 36 
   No Exit   -6.54       (-0.84) -13.61*   (-1.73) 69 
   Mean Difference (t value; z value)                      0.34                   0.43  
Type of Shares Issued at the IPO    
   Ordinary Shares Issued    0.21         (0.02) -10.98    (-1.30) 61 
   Non-voting Shares Issued -19.61**    (-2.64) -20.08**  (-2.50) 44 
   Mean Difference ( t value; z value )                     1.56                   1.03  
Dual Class Shareholder Structure    
    .75 ≤ Voting Rights ≤ 1.00 -21.32**    (-2.56) -18.94**   (-2.48) 36 
    Voting Rights < .75    6.09        (0.37)   10.65      (0.31) 12 
    Mean Difference ( t value )                   -1.59                  -1.41  
Outliers Analysis 
(trimmed mean, 5 percent) 
   
    .75 ≤ Voting Rights ≤ 1.00 -21.45***    (-2.86)  32 
    Voting Rights < .75     4.91        (0.38)  10 
    Mean Difference ( t value )                   -1.73*   
 
N = No. of observations; *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
H0-hypothesis are tested by t-test (mean) and Wilcoxon signed-rank test (median), respectively. Two-sample t-test 
and two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test look for differences in means (median) between the two 
sample partitions. 
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Figure 1 
Governance Changes Ten Years after the IPO 
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